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826 PARKHURST V. INDUSTRIAL Acc. COM. [20 C. (2d) 
San Pedro, etc. Co., supra; Jones v. Walker,47 Cal. App. (2d) 
566 [118 P. (2d) 299].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., 
and Peters, J. pro tem., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied October 
22,1942. Curtis, J~, and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 18334. In Bank. Sept. 24, 1942.] 
WILLIAM R. PARKHURST, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation - Compensable Injuries - Willful 
Misconduct. - Serious and willful misconduct, within the 
meaning of the workmen's compensation law, is conduct that 
the employer knows or should know is likely to cause serious 
injury, or conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the 
safety of others. 
[2] Evidence-Presumptions-Knowledge of Law.-An employer 
is charged with knowledge of the Common Drinking Cup and 
Water Cooler Protection Law. (Stats. 1917, p. 1517, Deering's 
Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 6259.) 
[3] Workmen's Compensation - Compensable Injuries - Willful 
Misconduct-Violation of Law. - A deliberate breach by an 
employer of a law framed in the interests of the workingman 
amoullts to serious and willful misconduct within the mean-
ing of the workmen's compensation law. 
[4] Id. - Certiorari -Findings - Miscond uct. - The question 
whether the serious and willful misconduct of an employer 
caused an employee's injury is essentially one of fact; and 
if there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of 
. [1] Serious and willful misconduct of employer, notes, 16 
A. L. R. 620, 58 A.L. R. 1379. See, also, 27 Cal. J!lr. 44l. 
[2] See 10 Cal. Jur. 760. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 6] Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 124; [2] Evidence, § 133; [4J Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 272(6); [5] Workmen's Compensation, § 180; [7J Master and 
Servant, § 72. 
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the Industrial Accident Commission on the question its award 
will not be disturbed, though the rule is otherwise if there is 
no evidence to support the finding. 
[5a, 5b] Id. - Evidence - Sufficiency-Willful Misconduct.-An 
Industrial Accident Commission's finding that the amoebic 
dysentery contracted by an employee was not caused by the 
serious and willful misconduct of the employer is not sup-
ported by the evidence where it appears that the employer in 
knowing violation of the Common Drinking and Water Cooler 
Protection Law furnished his employees with water by means 
of an open bucket and a common dipper, and where, irrespective 
of any charge of knowledge of the contamination of a reser-
voir from which water at times siphoned iato the line from 
which the drinking water was drawn,the employer was 
chargeable with knowledge of the danger incident to such 
means of distribution. Evidence that no ill effects were suf-
fered by previous users loses its pertinence in view of the 
finding of numerous complaints as to the water. 
[6] Id.-Compensable Injuries - Willful Misconduct - Mistaken 
Judgment as Defense.-The fact that an employer does not 
consider dangerous the distribution of drinking water by 
open bucket and cornmon dipper does not relieve him from 
liability for serious and willful misconduct in this respect. 
[7] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employees-Delegation of 
Employer's Duties.-A subcontractor employer cannot dele-
gate its duty to furnish its employees with pure drinking 
water in closed containers and individual drinking cups 
(Stats. 1915, p. 815, Deering'S Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 4725; 
Stats. 1917, p. 1517, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 6259). 
And it cannot avoid liability to an cmployee by claiming that 
it customarily accepted the facilities furnished by the gnn-
eral contractor und that the latter WUH undcr U contrndual 
obligation to it with respect to such faeilitics. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial A(',ei-
dent Commission denying additional compensation for per-
sonal injuries. Order annulled. 
William J. Currer, Jr., for Petitioner . 
C. Wesley Davis, Everett A. Cortenand J. Gould for 
Respondents. 
T RAY NOR, J.-Respondent Industrial Accident Com-
mission awarded the petitioner compensation for injuries 
received in the course of his employment but denied an 
.: ' 
828 PAltKHURST v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. COM. '[20 C. (2d) 
additional award claimed by reason of the alleged serious 
and willful misconduct of the employer. The sole issue in 
this proceeding is whether the commission's order that peti-
tioner's injury was not caused by the serious and willful 
misconduct of the employer finds support in the record. 
Between June 9, 1938, and September 15, 1938, petitioner 
was employed as a journeyman ironworker by the J. Phillip 
Murphy Corporation, which was engaged as a subcontractor 
in the installation of structural iron on a building project 
at Camarillo, California. In the course of his employment 
petitioner was exposed to entamoeba histolytica through the 
drinking water furnished at the project, and contracted 
amoebic ·dysentery. The medical testimony disclosed that the 
disease is usually contracted by drinking contaminated water, 
that water can be contaminated by contact with fecal matter 
or contaminated hands, and that a single person who is a 
carrier of the disease can infect the water supply and cause 
an epidemic among persons drinking the water. The water 
line at the project' was attached to a pipe connecting an 
irrigation pump and a neighboring uncovered reservoir. 
When a certain valve was opened to irrigate adjoining land, 
water from the reservoir would siphon into. the water line 
and outlets on the job. There was evidence that the reser-
voir was used as a swimmingpool.and that tests made by 
the county health authorities on May 17, 1939, revealed that 
the water, although still classified by them as good, was con~ 
taminated with fecal matter. The water was· drawn. from 
faucets used by the men in washing their hands On their 
way to and from the toilets, which were near some of the 
faucets. It was supplied to the men by an open bucket and 
common dipper, in violation of statutes requiring Closed con-
tainers and individual drinking cups. (Stats. 1917, p. 1517, 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6259; Stats. 1915, p. 815, Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, Act 4725.) The employer, commencing work 
as subcontractor after construction was under way, accepted 
the facilities furnished by the general contractor. He knew 
how the water was distributed, but D).ade no inquiry as to its 
source. At no time did he attempt to furnish his employees 
with' pure, fresh drinking water. Numerous men complained 
at various times to the employer's superintendent and man~ 
aging representative that the drinking water had a foul taste 
and odor, and gave them diarrhea and cramps. The super-
intendent acknowledged that the water was bad, but said in 
Sept. 1942] PARKHURST V. INDUSTRIAL Ace. COM. 
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effect that no other was available. All water available from 
wells in the district had a somewhat unpleasant taste and 
odor; The uncontradicted testimony of the health authori-
ties disclosed that they inspected the 'premises on August· 30, 
1938, in response to complaints made to their office regard-
ing the metho'd of distributing the water, and' ·that they 
ordered the· contractor to desist from distributing water in 
open containers and common dippers. (, 
Petitioner relies upon the violation of theSt~tutes ;and: 
the complaints by the men tosttpp6rt· hiS 'contention' thllt' 
the employer WaB guilty of serious and <'willful' n{isconduct. 
He contends that there was no. evidence to supportithe'comniis'::' 
sion'scontrary conclusion 'and attacks particuill.rly·the com~:' 
mission's finding that "No officer or representatife of.)'; Phil~; 
lip Murphy Corporation had anyknowledie, -eith~r actu:al 
. <l.r constructive, that the drinking water or the facilities . for 
d:istributing the drinking water furnished to its!einployees: 
on this job, was capable of producing iml6ebid' dysentery,' 
or was otherwise dangerous to the health of its employees. ": 
The {lOmmission did find, however, that'I>etitioner was·injured 
in, the course and scope of employment, and, awarded com-
pensation accordingly. " .. 
[11S'erious and willful misconduct is .conduct that the 
employer knew, or should have known, waS likely to cailse 
serious injury, or conduct that evinces a reckless disregard 
for the safety of others. (Hatlieway v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 
~3 Cal. (2d) 377 [90 P. (2d) 68]; EthelD.Oo. v, Industrial 
Ace. Oom., 219 CaL 699 [28 P. (2d) 919]; Hoffman v. Dept; 
of Indus. Relations, 209 Cal. 383[287 Pac. 974, 68 A.L. R. 
294]; Pacific Emp. Ins. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., ·209 Cal. 
412 [288 Pac. 66] ; Gordon v. IndustriaZ Acc.Oom., 199 Cal. 
420 [249 Pac. 849] ; Blue Diamond Plaster 00. v. Industrial 
Ace. Oom., 188 Cal. 403 [205 Pac. 678] ; E. Olemens Horst 
00. v. Industrial Ace. dom., 184 Cal. 180 [193 Pac, 105, 16 
A. L. R. 611] ; Helmick v. Industrial Ace. Oom.,46 Cal. App. 
(2d) 651[116 P. (2d) 658] ; Helme v. Great Western Milling 
00;, 43 Cal. App. 416 [185 Pac. 510].) It has been heid repeat-
edly that the employment of workmen under dangerous con-
ditions that can be guarded against constitutes a reckless 
disregard for their safety. (Hatheway v. Industrial Ace. 
Oom., supraj HojJ'TfI4n v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supraj 
Pacific Emp. Ins. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., supraj Gor-
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v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra; Johannsen v. Ind1.fstr.ial,A.cc. 
Cp~.,,113 Cal. App. 162 [298 Pac. 99].) The. test unde~ 
these cqses is whether the employer knowingly or . willfully 
committed an act that he knew or should have' known was· 
likely to' cau~e harm: to his employee. In the present case, 
the employer by knowingly violating its statutory duty to 
supply its employees with pure drinking water in closed con-
tainers and individual cups, set the conditions ·for the trans-
mission of various communicable diseases and exposed ita 
e:rnployees to the hazard of serious injury therefrom. 
It·is true that not every violation of a statute is serious 
and willful misconduct.· (Hoffman v. Dept. of Indus. Rela-
tions, supra;. Helme v. Great Western Milling Co., supra. See, 
also, Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra (commis-
sion's safety order) ; Great. Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 
170 Cal. 180 [149 Pac. 35] ; Simpson v. Industrial Acc. Com., 
87 Cal. App. 652 [262 Pac. 469] ; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 432.) In 
Hoffman v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, 209 Cal. 383, 390 [287 
Pac. 974, 68 A. ·L. R. 294], this. court stated: "It will be 
conceded that the violation of one statute may be far more 
serious, tllan the violation of another statute; and that the 
violation of the' same statute under one set of facts may not 
be' serious, whereas· under a different set of facts it will be 
quite serious indeed." It has long been recognized that 
communicable diseases are readily transmitted. by common, 
drinking cups and the statutes in the present case were de-
signed to safeguard employees against that hazard. Viola-
tion of these statutes is particularly serious when hundreds 
of men are. employed on the same project at the same time 
and do not have access to other drinking water. [2], The 
employer is charged with knowledge of the statute (Hoffman 
v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supra. See, also, 10 Cal. Jur. 
760) and was found by the commission to know that the 
water was distributed in violation of the statutory require-, 
ments. On these issues there was no conflict. Violation of the 
stat.utes in question was not mere. negligence (See Hoffman 
v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supra; Helme v .. QreatWestern 
Milling Co., supra;ln re Burns, 218 Mass. 8 [105N. E. 601, 
Ann. Oas. 1916A, 787]), but criminal conduct punishable as a 
misdemeanor. (Stats. 1917, p. 1517, Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act. 6259; Stats. 1915, p. 815, Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
4725). [3] .. " ... Where there is a deliberate breach of a 
law , ,~, which is framed in the interests of the wor~ 
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man, It will' be held that such a breach ... ' . amounts toserl-
ous misconduct. "So spoke thecou;rt in Fidelity ,e.tc. Co. v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., 171 CaL 728 [154 .. Pac. 834,t.R. 4. 
1916D, 903], animlling an award based on . a finding that 
an employee whose injury resulted from a violation of speed 
laws was not guilty of serious and willful misconduct. The 
rule must be similarly applied to the c(rD.duct of an employer. 
1t remains to determine whether th~re .'is' any eVidence in 
the record from, which the commission could find, that th~~e 
was .' no serious and willful miscon4uc~ by the eDlplc;>yer d(;l-
spite theviolatioIi of the statutes. [41 It is well settlid that 
the question whether serious ~nd willful miscond.uc~ of We 
employer caused the employee~s injury is essenii~ly.ori.e"of 
fact, and that if there is any sUbst.antial evidence' 't~ sup-
port the findings of the commission. its .. award ,win' not' be 
disturbed. Its award -Will be set asi"de, however, if there" i$ 
no evidence to support its findings. (HathewaYv. JndustriO-Z 
Abc. Com., supra; Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial· Acc. aom~, 
supra.) [5a] Respondent places great emphasis on evidenc~ 
in the record that the county health authorities . considered 
the water safe for drinking. The employer seeks to' draw 
an inference therefrom that it could not be charged' with 
knowledge that the water was unfit for· human consump-
tion. Actually, however, the opinion of the health authori~ 
ties referred only to the water in the reservoir nearly one 
year after the injury. They made po tests of the water 
hefore or at the time of the injury. Their examination did 
not extend to water in the buckets and dippers; which they 
, had previously ordered discontinued. Even If an inference 
could be drawn that the employer was,not chargeabk with 
kllowledge that the water in the reservoir was contaminated, it 
was nonetheless chargeable with knowledge of the danger in-
cidept to distribution by means of an open bucket and com:-
mon dipper. [6] While there was evidence that J.' Phillip 
Murphy, president, general manager, and sole ,stockholder 
of the employer corporation, had drunk the water from 
the common dipper, the most favorable1inference that can 
be drawn therefrom is that he did not consider the means 
of distribUtion dangerous. It has been' held, . how~ver, 
that an employer's mistake in judgment' does.not re-
lieve him from liability for serious and willful mi~co~duct. 
(Blue Di.amond Plaster Co. v. Industrial Acc.cCJom., -s~pra:) 
The evidence that the drinking facilities were. installe<i' :b;i 
.,' 
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the general contractor and were used by its employees with 
no ill effects will not support the commission's finding. 'l'he 
commission's finding regarding the numerous complaints reg-
istered by the men destroys the pertinence of the alleged 
effect of the water on previous users; [7] The testimony 
of the employer that it customarily accepted the facilities 
furnished by the general contractor and that the latter was 
under a contractual obligation to it with respect to such facil-
ities indicates a misconception of its duties and liabilities 
with regard to the safety of its employees. 'l'he employer 
was aware of the general contractor's breach of contract. 
Its own statutory duty to furnish its employees with pure 
drinking water in closed containers and in individual drink-
ing cups could not be delegated. [5b] In the light of the 
findings of the commission and in the absence or substantial 
evidence to support its conclusion that the injury Was not 
ca.used by the serious and willful misconduct of the em-
ployer, the order denying additional compensation is an-
nulled. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J;, Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Peters, 
J. pro tem., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., did not. participate herein. 
,in 
[Crim. No. 4421. In Bank. Sept. 24,1942.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MAUDE MAE' YOUNG, 
Appellant. 
[la,.lb] 'Homicide-Negligent Homicide-Construction ,of Statute. 
-'-In the 1941 amendment to Veh. Code, § 500, which refers 
to the crime of "negligent homicide," the term "negligent" 
is not used in its ordinary sense. And the specific terms in 
the code section describing the manner in whIch the vehicle 
must be driven to constitute a crime should be interpreted in 
accordance with the definitions given by courts to similar 
terms if those definitions may reasonably be said to fit the 
particular words used. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Homicide, § 25a; [2] Negli-
gence, § 3; Torts, § 2. 
Sept. 1942] PEOPLE V. YOUNG 
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[2] Negligence - Definition and Nature: Torts - Definition and 
Nature.-Ordinary negligence consists of acts or omissions 
which are not compatible with the standard of care exercised 
hy an abstract man of ordinary prudence. The test of such 
negligence is an objective, rather than a subjective, one. 
In case of the intentional tort, such as trespass and assault 
and battery, the test of wrongdoing is subjective as the intent 
of the wrongdoer is involved. As to conduct falling between 
these classes, the terms "gross negligence" and "wilful mis-
conduct" have been employed. ' 
[3a, 3b]Homicide-Negligent Homicide-Reckless Disregard of 
Safety.-The phrase "reckless disregard . of the safety 6f 
others," appearing in Yeh. Code, § 505, is equivaient to the 
phrase the "intentional doing of an act with wanton and 
reckless disregard of its possible results." There is no sub-
stantial difference between the words "wilful and wanton" 
in the statutory definitIon of reckless driving (Yeh. Code, 
§ 500) and "reckless" in § 500. . 
[4] ld.-Negligent Homicide-Indifference to Safety • ..,...A wilful. 
indifference to the safety of others, within the meaning of 
Yeh. Code, § 500, is an intentional lack of regard concerning 
the safety of others, or an intentional doing of something with 
knowledge that serious injury is a probable r~sult. . 
[6] ld.-Negligent Homicide.-A motorist who killed a passenger 
disembarking from a streetcar was not guilty of negligent 
homicide within Yeh. Code, § 500, where it appeared merely 
that she was guilty of negligence, as whtire it appeared that 
she was overtaking and endeavoring to pass a street car 
while eXlleeding the speed limit, but without traveling at a 
particularly excessive speed (35 m. p. h;), that she failed to 
stop at the rear of the car as required in the absence of a 
safety zone, that she failed to observe that the. car was being 
brought to a stop, and that she did not see the disembarking 
passenger until he stepped from the car. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County and from an order denying a new trial. Gor-
don Thompson, Judge. Judgment . reversed. 
Prosecution for negligent homicide. Judgment of convic-
tion reversed. 
Newton F. Rozzelle, Jr., for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Gilbert F. Nelson, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Respondent. 
[3] See 5 Am. Jur. 927. 
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